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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LAVON BELNAP DUNCAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Marion
W. Duncan, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.~VESTERN

REFRIGERATION CO.,
&a UTAH ICE & STORAGE
COMPANY, and NORTON F.
HECKER, and HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Case No. 9173

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
THE FACTS
In this brief we shall adopt the same terminology
as employed in appellant's brief in referring to the
parties.
We do not believe that the statement of facts set
forth in plaintiff's brief, fully reflects the material facts,
and we therefore deem it necessary to enlarge upon it.
Deceased Marion Duncan sustained fatal injuries as a
result of an automobile collision which occurred about
7:30A.M. on August 27, 1958 (R. 128, 138, 172-174). The
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accident occurred in Main Street, approximately in front
of Duncan's home. (R. 138, 203-205). The point of
the accident was approximately midway between Main
Street's intersections with 13th South Street and Cleveland Avenue. (R. 134-135, 146). There was no pedestrian
crosswalk at the point where the accident occurred, nor
in the near vicinity thereof. (R. 134, 146). In fact, the
nearest cross-walks were at the intersections above
named. (R. 146).
On plaintiff's case in chief, she offered absolutely
no evidence as to how the accident occurred. The only
testimony of any kind offered by the plaintiff on her
case in chief, which in any way even suggested any
negligence on the part of defendant Hecker, was the
testimony of the witness Lorin Kelly, as to a fragment
of a conversation which he heard between his wife and
the defendant Hecker. Kelly testified that he heard
Hecker tell his wife "I didn't see him." (R. 130, 133).
On cross-examination Kelly admitted that his wife had
told him that Hecker had said that he (decedent) walked
right into the side of the car. He also adn1itted that Iris
wife had testified on deposition that Hecker had said
decedent "ran" into the side of his car. (R. 13-±).
Upon this scrap of evidence alone, plaintiff relies
for a recovery against the defendants. There ''Tas no
evidence in the record whatsoeYer that deceased was ever
in a position where he could or should have been observed
by Hecker, in time to avoid a collision. At the conclusion
of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for a directed verdict, which motion was denied without prejudice. (R. 168).
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Defendants then offered the testin1ony of defendant
Hecker, who was the only surviving eye witness to the
accident, and whose testimony describing the accident is
found on pages 172 to 176 of the record. Hecker's testimony may be summarized as follows :
On the morning of the accident, he had left his home
at approxin1ately 7 :15 A.M. in a car furnished to him
both for personal and business use by his employer. (R.
154, 160, 172). At the place of the accident, and for son1e
distance prior thereto, he was proceeding northerly along
Main Street at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour. (R.
172, 173). He was traveling in the right hand lane for
north bound traffic. (R. 172). At the place where the
accident occurred, Main Street was a four lane highway,
two lanes for north bound traffic and two lanes for south
bound traffic. (R. 172). Hecker described the accident as
follows:

"A.. Well, as near as I can fix it in my
mind, as I was going north on l\1ain Street there
was a car directly in front of me in the same
lane of traffic that I was traveling, there was
another car on my left going in the same direction slightly ahead of me, and just traveling
along under our normal speed in going to work.
And all at once why there was a car on my left
started to slow down, and I immediately noted
that so I started to slow too, and at the same
time I noticed the lights flash from the car directly in head of me so I started to apply my
brakes, and as I got closer why I had to apply
my brakes harder because the car directly in
front of me had almost come to a stop, and at
the time that I almost got stopped, that is I was
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

sliding my wheels at the time this man came
right over the front of the car on my left.
"Q. When you say 'this man' "A. Mr. Duncan is known.
"Q. All right.
"A. Came over the fender of this other car.
"Q. When you say the 'came over the fender' can you describe a little bit what you mean
by that expression~
"A. Well, I can hardly explain it in this
way, I seen the man just as he came off the fender of the car, and that is the first time that I
had seen him.
"Q. Was he crawling or climbing~
"A. No, he was just coming at me from off
the other car. I couldn't tell whether - I just
glimpsed at him as he came off of that car, and
by that time he struck. I didn't have no time to
determine whether he had been running or what."
Decedent's head struck the windshield on the extreme
left side. (Ex. D-9, R. 154, 175). Hecker stopped within
a few feet. (R. 176, 212). When got out of his car, the
injured n1an was lying near the left rear corner of the
car. (R. 176). Both the car which had been traveling at
Hecker's left, and the car which had been preceding him,
left the scene of the accident, and the respective drivers
never idntified themselves. (R. 177).
Hecker's version of the accident is corroborated by
certain circumstantial evidence. It w·as stipulated that
the deceased had a broken shin bone and a gouge n1ark
in the front part of his right leg 14¥2 inches above the
heel, and that there was a scuff or brush n1ark ·on the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

sole of the right shoe. (R. 169, 170, 193, Ex. 2). This
strongly suggests an impact on decedent's lower right
leg. However, neither Hecker nor any of the innurnerable policemen who examined the Hecker automobile
discovered any damage to it, except the shattered windshield. (R. 213-214, 230-231). Careful investigation and
examination of the front of the car and bun1per, failed
to reveal any dents, broken glass, or any blood, bits of
flesh, or clothing, or any other indicia of irnpact. (R. 158,
212-214, 230-231). It may fairly be inferred, therefore,
that the injury to the lower leg was sustained in son1e
manner, other than by collision with the Hecker car.
The glasses of deceased were found intact about ten
feet in front of the Hecker automobile, and were subsequently returned to plaintiff by the police. (R. 147, 150,
179, 180). This also strongly suggests that deceased was
struck, and his glasses knocked off before his head came
into collision with the Hecker automobile. It should also
be observed that immediately after the accident Hecker
started a search for witnesses. (R. 178-179). This is not
what a guilty individual would do.
By way of rebuttal testimony, plaintiff attempted to
show that there were no other cars moving along with
the Hecker automobile. Plaintiff also attempted to destroy Hecker's testimony by proof of statements made
by him at the time of the accident, which differed in some
details from his testimony at trial. However, since the
verdict was in defendants' favor all conflicts in evidence
must be resolved in their favor.
Plaintiff also offered as rebuttal testimony, the testi-
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mony of investigating police officers as to skid marks,
etc., which testimony was offered for the purpose of
attempting to prove speed on the part of Hecker. (R.
209). This testimony was properly rejected by the court,
upon objection of defendants, since plaintiff had claimed
speed as a ground of negligence against defendants, and
any evidence with respect thereto should have been presented as part of plaintiff's case in chief. (R. 33).
In summary, the only evidence as to how the accident
happened is the testimony of Hecker himself. This testimony exonerates defendants from any liability, since it
shows that deceased was first struck by another vehicle
and was then thrown into collision ·with the Hecker auto\
mobile, and that nothing that Hecker could have done
could have avoided the second collision, after the danger
thereof became apparent. As heretofore noted, the testiInony of Hecker is supported by circumstantial evidence.
If the testimony of Hecker is rejected, and found to
be unworthy of belief, there is N 0 evidence before the
court as to how the accident happened, and therefore no
evidence on which a claim of negligence against defendants could be based. The 1nost that could be said for
plaintiff's evidence would be that there would be evidence
to show that at the time of the accident, there were no
cars proceeding northerly in front of or at the side of
Hecker's automobile. If that be believed, it not only fails
to make a case of negligence against Hecker, but n1akes a
clear case of contributory negligence against the deceased. Certainly if the I-Iecker car was approaching with
no other vehicles in front of it or at its side, to obstruct
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deceased's view of it, deceased was clearly guilty of
negligence in walking or running into it. If the deceased
was not struck by another car before collision with the
Hecker car, the physical evidence shows without dispute,
that the collision would have resulted from his running
into the side of Hecker's car, since the only damage to it~
was that created by the collision of deceased's head with
the windshield. Such damage could hardly have resulted
from a frontal collision.
It should also be noted here that plaintiff's own
testimony shows without dispute that deceased had very
poor vision when not aided by glasses. (R. 148). Another
very reasonable and plausible explanation of this accident was that deceased may have lost his glasses as he
ran across the stre-et, and not being able to see well, he
may, as a result of such impaired vision, have run into
the pathway of the Hecker car, when it was so close that
a collision could not be avoided.
Plaintiff is on the horns of this dilemn1a : Either the
accident occurred as Hecker testified, in which event
there would be no negligence on his part, since plaintiff
was not seen in sufficient time to avoid a collision, because of the view being obstructed by other vehicles; or
else the cause of the accident is left to pure speculation
and conjecture. In either event, plaintiff cannot recover.
POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF DEFENDANTS, AND FOR WANT OF SUCH
EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A
VERDICT IN THEIR FAVOR.
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POINT II
IF DECEASED WAS NOT GUILTY OF ·CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS AT
LEAST AN ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
JURY FINDING OF THAT FACT.
POINT III
'THE EVIDENCE RE•CEIVED BY THE COURT ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LORIN KELLY OVER PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION, WAS ADMISSIBLE AND WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE. THE INSTRUCTION
GIVEN BY THE COUR'T ON THAT DOCTRINE WAS IN
PRINCIPLE AND WAS MORE THAN PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE.
POINT V
THE .COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S PROFERRED EVIDENCE OF SKID MARKS ON
REBUTTAL.
POINT VI
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT
HECKER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT A'T
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. EVEN IF THERE WAS
SUCH EVIDENCE, IT WOULD BE IMMA1TERIAL ON APPEAL, SINCE THE JURY FOUND NO LIABILITY ON THE
PART OF HECKER.
POINT VII
'THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WERE ADEQUATE.

THE

POINT VIII
THE APPEAL AS AGAINST HARTFORD ACCIDENT &
INDEMNITY COMPANY, NOT HAVING BEEN ARGUED OR
BRIEFED, IS WAIVED.
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ARGUMENT
Defendants having prevailed in the court below,
they are entitled to have the evidence surveyed in the
light most favorable to them. Morey v. Rodberg, 7 Ut.
2d 299, 323 P2d 717; Hadley v. Wood, (Ut.), 345 P2d 197.
Viewed, in this light, the evidence cornpels the affirmance of the judgment below.
POINT I
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF DEFENDANTS, AND FOR WANT OF SUCH
EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A
VERDICT IN THEIR FAVOR.

As we have noted in our statement of facts, the only
testimony in the record as to how the accident occurred
is the testimony of the defendant Hecker, himself. That
testimony completely exonerates the defendants frorn
any negligence. If that testimony is rejected as unworthy
of belief there is no evidence left in the record upon
which the jury could make a finding as to how the accident occurred. The plaintiff had the burden of proving
negligence on the part of defendants and wholly failed
to produce any evidence to prove a prilna facie case. Her
attempted destruction of the testimony of Hecker does
not in any wise tend to establish a set of facts upon
which she can recover. On this state of the record there
is nothing on which to base a finding of negligence and
the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor
of defendants.
As stated 1n 5A Am. J ur. 523, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic, Sec. 450 :
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"'-Generally, it has been held that the owner
or driver of an autornobile is not liable for injuries
to a pedestrian received when such pedestrian
collided with the side of the automobile, either
upon the ground that the driver is not guilty of
negligence or upon the ground that the injured
pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence."
If the court finds that we are correct in this point,
it is unnecessary to consider any other points, and judgment for the defendants should be affirmed.
POINT II
IF DECEASED WAS NOT GUILTY OF ·CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS AT
LEAST AN ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
JURY FINDING OF THAT FACT.

We answer here plaintiff's points 2, 3, and 4.
A. UNDER WELL ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW, DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF ·CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Sec. 57-7-143, U.C.A., 1953, provides, insofar as lnaterial here, as follows:
" (a). Every pedestrian crossing a roadway
at any point other than within a 1narked crosswalk or within an un1narked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
upon the roadway."
The evidence in this case shows ''ithout dispute that
at the point where the accident occurred there \Yas no
pedestrian crosswalk. It was approxll:nately half wa:T
between two well defined intersections. Clearly, deceased
was not in a cross-walk; and if the accident happened in
any way other than testified by Hecker, he (deceased,)
1nust have violated the foregoing statute, and b3T reason
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thereof, he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
The general rule in this regard is set forth in 38 Am.
Jur., pages 877 and 878, Negligence, Sec. 196, as follows:
"The general rule is that the violation by the
plaintiff of a statute or ordinance prohibiting
acts which endangered him constitutes a defense
in an action for negligence, or at any rate, constitutes a prima facie case of contributory negligence which will preclude a recovery by the
plaintiff unless rebutted, provided the prohibition
of the statute or ordinance is intended to apply
for the benefit of the defendant in the situation
wherein the plaintiff was injured, and the violation of the law is a proximate cause of the injury.
One who has violated a safety statute laying
down a rule of conduct cannot be heard to say
that he exercised ordinary care or could not have
anticipated injury from its violation, unless compliance with the statute was impossible under the
circumstances or would have subjected him to
other imminent and apparent dangers. A causal
violation of a statute puts the offender in the
class of those who fail to obey legal rules for
conduct, when he seeks to recover for the negligence of another."
That rule has been consistently followed by this
Court in a long line of decisions dating from earliest
times:
Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., (Utah), 88
Pac. 683.
Jensen v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., (Utah), 132
Pac. 8.
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., (Utah), 134
Pac. 567.
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Shortino v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., (Utah), 174
Pac. 860.
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., (Utah), 69 Pac.
(2d) 502.
Graham v. Johnson, (Utah), 166 Pac. (2d) 230.
North v. Cartwright, (Utah), 229 Pac. (2d) 871.
Hayden v. Cederlund, (Ut.), 263 P2d 796.
The rule has been applied frequently in situations
like the one here, where a pedestrian has undertaken to
cross a busy street in violation of the foregoing statute.
In fact, a long line of decisions starting with Reid v.
Owens, 98 Ut. 50, 93 P2d 680, have held the pedestrian
guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law.
In Mingus v. Olsson, (Utah), 201 Pac. (2d) 495,
involving a pedestrian who was assu1ned to be in a
cross-walk, the court said:
"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian
who undertakes to cross a busy street of a large
city, without first observing for vehicular traffic
is guilty of contributory negligence. And this is
true, even though he may be crossing in a crosswalk, and have the right of ·way. * * * The rights
of pedestrians to the use of the public streets
are the same as those of a n1otorist - neither
greater nor less. Hence, the sa1ne general duties
devolve upon then1. * * * Of course \Ye do not n1ean
to in1ply that a n1ere glance in the direction of the
approaching autmnobile \Yould suffice. The duty
to look has inherent in it the duty to see what
there is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it."
In Sant v. liiiUer, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719,
a pedestrian atte1npting to cross a street not in a pedestrian cross-walk, and crossing in a diagonal fashion,
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(as was deceased here), was held guilty of contributory
negligence as a Inatter of law.
In Cox v. Thompson, (litah), 25± Pac. (2d) 1047,
this court said :
"Contributory negligence becomes a question
of law when from the facts reasonable men can
draw but one inference and that inference points
unerringly to the negligence of decedent as contributory to his death. * * *

* * *

'•* * * Crossing a highway at a point where
there was no marked crosswalk, decedent was
duty bound to yield the right of way to a vehicle
upon the roadway. See 41-6-79, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This he failed to do. fie, in addition,
apparently failed to look, or having looked failed
to see what he should have seen and paid heed
to it. I-le said nothing and did nothing which indicated he was in any way aware of the danger
presented. Decedent was properly found negligent
as a matter of law. See Mingus v. Olsson, supra.''
In Smith vs. Bennett, (Utah), 265 Pac. (2d) 401,
this court said :
"Plaintiff's failure to see and yield the right
of way to defendant's automobile only a few feet
away in a position of immediate danger constitutes contributory negligence which caused her
InJUries ....
"* * * In the instant case there was but one
demand upon plaintiff's attention. There is no
room for reasonable difference of opinion as to
where her attention should have been concentrated· it was incumbent upon her to observe the
condition of approaching traffic. That she failed
to use due care in doing so is rnanifest from the
evidence."
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See also Gittens vs. Lundberg, (Utah), 284 Pac. (2d)
1115, and Fox v. Taylor, (Utah), No. 9122 (not yet
reported).
B. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS, IF IT
DOES NOT COMPEL, A FINDING OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.

Even if it cannot be said as a matter of law that
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, the evidence certainly amply justifies a finding to that effect
The language of this court in the recent case of Holmes
v. He~derbrecht, (Utah), 348 P. (2d) 565, is singularly
appropriate here:
"From the facts shown it appears likely that
the defendant was close enough to the plaintiff
when she walked into the path of his automobile
that reasonable care for her own safety would
have dictated that she stop and permit him to
pass. The question whether she used the care
which an ordinary, reasonable person would have
done for her own safety in that regard was submitted to the jury. A consideration of all of the
instructions together as they must be, indicates
that the issues, both of the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiff's contributory negligence, were
fully and fairly presented to the jury and in such
a manner that no confusion would result therefrom.''
C. THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE UPON THE
PART OF A PERSON KILLED IN AN ACCIDENT HAS NO
APPLI,CATION HERE.

Plaintiff seeks to take refuge in the fmniliar presumption that a person killed in an accident is presumed
to be in the exercise of due care for his own safety,
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in the absence of evidence to the contr;·ary. Plaintiff overlooks completely the qualification of the rule. It is well
settled that this presurnption has no application where
there is testimony as to the facts leading up to the
accident and as to the conditions surrounding the accident. In Ryan vs. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah), 151
Pac. 71, this court laid down the rule as follows :
"In the absence of evidence there is a presumption that the deceased used due care, and,
for his protection did all that reasonably was
required of him. * * * When, however, facts and
circumstances are proven to show just what the
deceased did, or failed to do, then his oare, or the
want of it, is to be determined, not on the: presumption, but upon the facts and circumstances
proven. That is, whenever the facts or circumstances are shown concerning which the presumption is indulged, the presumption ceases a>nd the
controversy is to be decided by the weight of the
evidence adduced." (Emphasis ours.)
The rule has been consistently followed. See Perrin,
v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Utah), 201 Pac. 405.
In Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co., (Utah),
275 Pac. 582, this court said:
"'The presumption that the deceased, in the
absence or independently of evidence, used due
care and did all that prudence required, is but
an application of the general rule of law that
all persons charged with negligence are, in the
absence of evidence, presumed to have exercised
due care, and that the burden is cast on him
who asserts negligence to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. The presumption
applies, not only to a person since deceased, but
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to a plaintiff and to a defendant as well, when
charged with negligence. When evidence or facts
and circumstances were adduced respecting the
charged negligence of the deceased, the plaintiff,
in determining the ultimate fact of such negligence or the want of it, has no more right to have
the presumption considered as of evidentiary force
or effect and to have it cast on the scales and
weighed and considered in connection with proven
facts and circumstances bearing on the question
than had the defendant when evidence was adduced respecting its charged negligence to have
the presumption as to it cast on the scales and
considered as of evidentiary force and effect."
( E1nphasis ours.)
In Aiingtts v. Olsson, (Utah), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, this
court said:
"Plaintiff relies on an asserted presumption
that deceased was, at the time of his injury, in
the exercise of due care for his own safety. It is
true that in certain death cases, there is a presumption that decedent was in the exercise of
due care for his own safety. But there is no room
for such a presumption where, as here, there was
positive evidence not only as to the fatal accident
itself, but to the. conduct of decedent leadtng up
to the fatal accident. ' Such a presumption must
give \Yay to the positive evidence adduced."
(E1nphasis ours).
To the san1e effect see J(ing v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western R. Co., (Utah), 211 Pac. (2d) 833.
In the case of Compton vs. Ogden Union Ravlway
Depot Company, (Utah), 235 Pac. (2d) 515, cited and
relied upon by the plaintiff, this court said:
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"The presumption is applicable where there
is no evidence as to the care used, or perhaps
where the evidence con1es from an adverse witness
who n1ay be subject to disbelief by the jury, or
where there is sufficient uncertainty in the evidence as to cast doubt on the testimony. It has
no application where, as here, the deceased is
observed dun,'ng the per~od prior to and at the
t~me she is .fatally injured and the witness is
avaliable and testified. * * *
"It seems inescapable that the deceased was
guilty of contributory negligence. It was her duty
to look and listen for trains before going on the
tracks. She had a clear view of the tracks to the
north, well before she got far enough west to
be in the path of the train. Under the evidence
the engine was there to be seen. If decedent had
looked at any time, either as she started, or as
she pursued a course parallel to, but dangerously
near the tracks, she must necessarily have seen
the train approaching. She was, therefore, either
negligent in failing to look or in failing to heed
the train if she saw it.'' (Emphasis ours.)
See also Tuttle vs. Pacific Intermountain Express
Co., (Utah), 242 Pac. (2d) 764, and Cox v. Thompson,
(Utah), 254 Pac. (2d) 1047.
In JJfecham v. Allen, (Utah), 262 Pac. (2d) 285, this
court said:
"From the basic fact that a human being was
accidentally killed a presumption arises which
requires the trier of the facts to assume the presumed facts, that decedent used due care for his
own safety, in the absence of a prima facie showing to the contrary, but in this kind of a presumption upon the making of such showing, the pre-
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surnption disappears from and becomes wholly
inoperative in the case, and the trial from then on
should proceed exactly the same as though no
presumption ever existed, or had any effect on
the case."
See also the language of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in the case of Rank v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 370 Pa. 107, 97 A2d 198, where the court said:
"The material facts in this case are undisputed and duly explain the happening. The presumption that a person who has lost his life
exercised due care is not applicable where the
plaintiff's own testinwny clearly established the
decedent's negligence. Weldon, Adm'x vs. Pittsburgh Railway Company, 352 Pa. 103, 41 A2d
856; Simmonds v. Penn Fruit Company, 354 Pa.
154, 47 A2d 231. The instinct of self preservation
upon which the presumption is founded, was conspicuously absent here. The decedent's unfortunate death was caused by his own unjustifiable
conduct.''
It should also be pointed out, that even in cases
where the presumption is available, it does no n1ore than
relieve the deceased of contributory negligence, and doe8
not give rise to an inference of negligence on the part
of the defendant, which still n1ust be proved by positive
evidence. In 16 An1. J ur., pages :207-8, the rule is stated
as follows:
"Negligence on the part of the person injured and killed is ordinarily not presumed; he
is presu1ned, on the contrary, to have exercised
due care for his own safety at the tilne of his
injnry. This presumption is indulged, ho·wever,
only to relieve a plaintiff fr01n an inference of
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negligence and not to supply evidence of the
negligence of a defendant. :Moreover, the circunlstances surrounding the rnishap may be such as
to rebut the presumption of due care and even
to raise a presurnption of contributory negligence on the part of the person killed."
In the court's instruction No. 1-± (R. 89), the jury
was advised that deceased was presun1ed to be in the
exercise of due care for his own safety, unless it was
"pursuaded frorn a preponderance of the evidence" that
he was guilty of contributory negligence. Under the
evidence adduced, the instruction was considerably rnore
than plaintiff was entitled to have, and she is in no
position to complain. The error, if any, was in her favor.
POINT III
'THE EVIDENCE RE:CEIVED BY THE COURT ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LORIN KELLY OVER PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION, WAS ADMISSIBLE AND WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED.

vVe answer here, plaintiff's Point I.
It is interesting to note that plaintiff cites no authority in support of her contention that the court erred
in permitting the witness Kelly, to answer, over objection,
questions propounded to him on cross-exarnination. Had
plaintiff's counsel made an examination of the la\\·, \H~
do not believe that this point would now be urged by
plaintiff.
On direct examination of the witness l(elly, plaintiff developed evidence as to a fragment of a conversation
overheard by the witness between the defendant I-Iecker
and Kelly's wife. The only portion heard by the witness
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was that I-Iecker said to his wife "I didn't even see
him.'' We assumed that this evidence was offered again;:;t
Hecker as an extra judicial achnission against interest.
liowever, plaintiff having opened the door, defendant
was entitled to develop by cross examination the entire
conversation. The rule is stated in 20 Am. J ur. 463 and
464, Evidence, Sec. 551, as follows :
"If a statement is adrnissible in evidence as
an adn1ission or declaration, it is admissible as
an entirety, including parts that are unfavorable,
as well as those that are favorable to the party
offering it in evidence. In the event a statement
admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent is entitled
to have placed in evidence all that was said or
written by or to the declarant in the course of
such conversation or correspondence, provided
the other statements have some bearing upon, or
connection with, the admission or declaration in
evidence and are not excluded by a rule of law
other than the hearsay rule." (Emphasis ours.)
See also 58 Am. J ur. 350, Witnesses, Sec. 629, as
follows:
"Of course, it is error for the trial court to
refuse to permit the cross-examination of a ·witness to extend to all matters gennane to the direct
examination for such a cross-examination is a
matter of absolute right and is not a mere privilege; but under the majority American rule a
witness rnay not be asked any question on crossexamination which does not tend to rebut, impeach, rnodify, or explain any of his testimony."
Also at page 351, Sec. 630, it is said:
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"The rule should be liberally construed so as
to permit on cross exa1nination any question which
reasonably tends to explain, contradict or discredit any te.stimony given by the witnes; in chief,
or to test h1s accuracy, 1nenwry, veracity, character, or credibility." (Emphasis ours.)
And at page 353, Sec. 635, it is further said:
"'Where some part of a conversation is introduced in evidence during the examination in chief,
the whole of the conversation referring to the
same subject matter 1nay be adduced on the crossexamination."
See also page 360, Sec. G-11, where it is said:
"When a subject is opened by the direct examination, the cross-examining counsel may go
fully into the details thereof, and is not confined
to the particular part of it embodied within the
questions asked on direct examination.''
The rule is stated thus in YII \Vignwre on I~~vidence
523, § 2113:
''For the reasons already sufficiently examined.. the opponent, against whom part of an
utterance has been put in, may, in his turn,
complement it by putting in the remainder, in
order to secure for the tribunal a complete understanding of the total tenor and effect of the utterance.... But there is and could be no difference
of opinion as to the opponent's right, if a part
only has been put in, himself to put in the rema~"nder .. .
"This right of the opponent to put in the
remainder is universally conceded, for every kind
of utterance without distinction; and the only
question can be as to the scope and limits of the
right." (Sic.)
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rrhe sarne author at page 529, Sec. 2115 says:
"The general phrasing of the principle, then,
is that when any part of an oral statement has
been put in evidence by one party, the opponent
may afterwards (on cross-examination or reexamination) put in the remainder of what was
said on the same subject at the same time ....
"Its most common application is to conversations in general, including the admission of an
opponent and to inconsistent statements of a witness used in impeachment; here it may be noted
that a conversation in a party's presence is in
effect merely one form of an admission, because
statements in a party's presence are usually eqivalent to adrnissions by him."
See also Vol. IV, § 1059 at p. 24.
The reasons for the rule are clearly and succinctly
explained in 3 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 1957,
§ 1063, as follows :
"Broad statements repeatedly occur in everyday speech which, taken by themselves, have a
much wider, and sometimes a wholly different,
meaning than when considered in connection with
the entire conversation in which they occur or
with precedent or subsequent qualifications made
by the speaker. It would obviously be unfair in
such instances to isolate, as alone adrnissible, those
portions of a conversation n1ost darnaging to the
speaker. l-Ienee it is the well-settled rule that the
whole of a declaration or staternent containing
an adn1ission should be received together. This
rule is stated, in the language of Mr. Justice Field,
thus: 'Every admission upon which a party relies
is to be taken as an entirety of the fact which
n1akes for his side, with the 'qualifications which
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lirnit, n1odify, or destroy its effect on the other
side.' This is now a settled principle which has
passed, by its universality, into an axiom of the
law. Best lays down the rule as follows:
•· 'Where part of a staternent is used as selfharming evidence against a party, he has a right
to have the whole of it laid before the jury who
rnay then consider and attach what weight they
see fit to any self-serving statements it contains.'''
It would be rnanifestly unfair to permit plaintiff to
develop evidence as to a fragment of a conversation,
and then to take refuge in the hearsay rule in an atten1pt
to prevent the triers of the facts from learning the full
conversation. The law, as above set forth, clearly does
not countenance such practice. Plaintiff having introduced the subject, defendant was entitled to show by
cross-examination of the same witness the full conversation, and the hearsay objection is not available to plaintiff to prevent the facts from being proven.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE. THE INSTRUCTION
GIVEN BY THE COURT ON THAT DOCTRINE WAS CORRECT IN PRINCIPLE AND WAS MORE THAN PLAINTIFF
WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE.

vVe here answer plaintiff's Point V.
A. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 'TO WARRANT THE
GIVING OF AN INSTRUCTION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE.

A complete answer to plaintiff's contention is found
in the recent case of Fox vs. Taylor) #9122, recently
decided by this court, but not yet reported. In that case,
a plaintiff atte1npting to cross a busy street at a place
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other than in a .cross-walk was struck by defendant's
automobile. ]'rom a verdict and judg1nent in favor of the
defendant, plaintiff appealed, clain1ing, among other
things, that she was entitled to an instruction on last
clear chance. This court, speaking through Justice
Crockett, unani1nously held:
"The cases where that doctrine is applicable
fall into two distinct categories. See Sec. 479 and
480, Restatement of Torts. The first we here consider relates to situations where both the defendant and the plaintiff are guilty of continuing
negligence, and where the plaintiff could, by
exercising due care, avoid the peril at any time
up to the 1noment of injury. In such case the
injury is the result of the concurring negligence
of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Under
those facts the defendant can be held responsible
only if he actually knows of the plaintiff's situation of peril in time to have the 'last clear chance'
to avoid the harm, and fails to do so. Ibid; see
Sec. 480, Restatement of Torts; see concurring
opinion, Wade, J., Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah,
505, 511, 201 P. 2d 495. Otherwise the negligence
of one would be just as much the proximate cause
of the injury as the other's. The facts here do
not fall within the above pattern because there
is no evidence that the defendant actually knew
of plaintiff's situation until too late to avoid
striking her.
"The plaintiff insists, however, that the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable and the
defendant should be held liable even if he did not
actually know of her peril because in the exercise
of due care he should have observed and avoided
striking her. The contention involves consideration of the other facet of the doctrine of last
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clear chance. \Vhere the defendant does not actually know of the plaintiff's situation of peril, the
doctrine can only properly be applied where the
plaintiff has gotten into a position of inextricable
peril. An illustration of this is where a person
has caught his foot in a railroad switch, or is in
some other sirnilar predicament, so that he is
thereafter unable to avert the injury. In such a
situation, the plaintiff's negligence has come to
rest and it is not at the time of the impact an
active concurring proxin1ate cause of the injury.
In such circumstances the defendant rnay be held
responsible if he either knows or in the exercise
of reasonable care should know of the plaintiff's
helpless situation in time to avoid the injury and
fails to do so. Ibid; see Sec. 479, Restaternent of
Torts. This is so because the defendant's later
negligence, after the plaintiff's negligence has
come to rest, is deemed to be the sole proximate
cause of the injury.
"In regard to the application of this principle,
the plaintiff here is faced with a dilemma; she
was either in inextricable peril or she was not.
If she was not in inextricable peril, then at any
instant up to the ti1ne she got into such predicament, by the exercise of reasonable care, she
could have observed the oncmning car and have
avoided being hit. On the other hand, she could
only have gotten into inextricable peril by getting
into the path of the defendant's car, and her peril
could be considered inextricable only if the defendant was then too close to avoid striking her.
Thus, by the very description of the situation,
he did not have the 'last clear chance' to avoid
the injury. As the phrase indicates, it must be a
fair and clear opportunity and not a mere possibility that the collision could have been avoided.
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Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231.
It is our conclusion that the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the case upon the
doctrine of last clear chance.''
The foregoing language of this court appears to be
fully applicable to the facts in the case at bar.
Another recent case wherein this court held that a
pedestrian crossing out of the cross-walk was not entitled
to an instruction on last clear chance, was Cox v. Thompson, 254 Pac. 2d 1047. This court there said, at page 105:2:
The last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable
in the present instance. In order for the question
of last clear chance to be properly submitted to
a jury the evidence must be such as would in
all probability reasonably support a finding that
there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the
exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the injury.
It would not be sufficient that it appear from
hindsight that by some possible measure the defendant by the 'skin of his teeth' could have
avoided the injury. See M or by v. Rogers, Utah,
252 p. 2d 231.
1

"

* * *
"Thus the matter was properly withheld from
the jury if the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b)
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff
was inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril
in ti1ne to avoid har1u, and (c) the defendant was
thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harn1ing decedent."
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B. IF PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE, THE INSTRUCTION
GIVEN BY THE COURT ADEQUATELY AND ACCURATELY
ADVISED 'THE JURY CONCERNING IT.

The record in this case is con1pletely devoid of any
evidence that defendant had a fair and clear opportunity
to avoid the accident after plaintiff's position of peril
was apparent, or should have been apparent to Hecker
in the exercise of reasonable care. However, if it be
considered that plaintiff was entitled to such an instruction, it does not appear that there was any error in
the instruction given by the court. The instruction requested by plaintiff was substantially the language of
Sec. 480 of the A.L.l. Restate1nent of Torts. The language
of the instruction given by the court \vas taken substantially verbatim fr01n J.I.F.U., Sec. 17.20. After a
careful comparison of the hvo instructions, we are unable
to detect any n1aterial differences between then1.
It appears that the gist of plaintiff's objection to the
court's instruction, is that set forth in paragraph 2
thereof, which reads as follows:
"2. That he was, by reason of inattention or lack
of proper alertness ,totally unaware of the peril
that threatened him.''
vVe believe that this condition is irnplicit in the
(b) paragraph of plaintiff's requested instruction providing "that the plaintiff was inattentive, and therefore
unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the hann."
That inattention or lack of alertness is an essential
element, and in fact the very basis of the doctrine under
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the situation envisioned in Sec. 480 of the Restatement,
is made absolutely clear by the com1nent follo"\ving that
section in the Restatement. It is there said:
"This section states the rule under which a
plaintiff, who could have made timely discovery
of his peril if he had been on the alert, can recover notwithstanding his negligent inattent~on.
In such a situation, the defendant has no reason
to believe that he has the exclusive power to prevent the harm unless he not only knows of the
plaintiff's situation but realizes or has reason to
realize that the plaint,iff does not know the peril
of his sitt~ation and is, therefore, in a danger
from which only the defendant's careful action
can protect him.

"* * * The defendant must also realize or
have reason to realize that the plaivntiff is inattentive and, therefore, is in peril. * * * Therefore, the defendant is liable only if he realizes or
has reason to realize that the plaintiff i'S inattentive and consequently in peril." (Emphasis ours.)
The trial court should not be criticized, much less
held in error, for choosing the language of an instruction
carefully drafted by a cmnrnittee of recognized experts
after mature consideration and deliberation, in preference to the language of an instruction prepared by an
advocate in the heat of battle. It is to be noted also,
that in the plaintiff's request she cited in support thereof
J.I.JJ\U., Sec. 17.20. She therefore apparently recognized
and represented to the Court that the language of her
request was essentially the sarne as the J.I.F.U. form.
(\,rtainly, if there was error in the language of the
court's charge, plaintiff is chargeable with having lead
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the court into it, by virtue of having cited the J.I.:B,.U.
fonn in support of plaintiff's own request.

POINT V
THE ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S PROFERRED EVIDENCE OF SKID MARKS ON
REBUTTAL.

We answer here plaintiff's Point VI.
It appears from the pretrial order, that one of the
grounds of negligence on which plaintiff intended to
rely for a recovery against defendants, was excessive
speed on the part of the defendant I-Iecker. This being
so, under familiar principles of law, plaintiff should
have offered on her case in chief any evidence which
she had to support such a claim. No such evidence was
offered. In fact, plaintiff was scrupulous to keep such
evidence out of the record on her case in chief, and
interposed objections when counsel for the defendant
undertook to introduce that subject on cross-examination
of defendant Hecker as part of plaintiff's case in chief.
Only after defendant had rested ,did plaintiff con1e
foreward and offer to prove the length of the skid rnarks
left by the Hecker auton1obile as a basis for showing
Hecker's speed in1mediately prior to the accident. Plaintiff made no attempt to show that the need for this
testimony could not have been anticipated, and in view
of her claim at pretrial, could not well have made such
a showing. Neither did plaintiff undertake to show that
Officer Begent was not available as a witness at th(~
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time her case in chief was presented. 1Ier only excuse
for the belated offer of this testimony was that it tended
to rebut the testimony of Hecker from which it was
developed incidentally on his examination, that he was
traveling about 25 to 30 miles an hour.
A wide discretion is vested in the trial court in
determining what evidence is adnrissible by way of rebuttal, and that discretion ·will not be interfered with
by the appellate court in the absence of a clear sho\Ying
of abuse. The considerations which should guide the trial
court in exercising this discretion and the rules with
respect thereto, are set forth in 53 Am. Jur. commencing
at page 101, Trial, commencing with Sec. 115 as follows:
"While the trial court is vested with wide
discretion in permitting departures from the
usual order of proof when circumstances of the
case require, the general rule is that the party
who has the burden of proof - he who holds
the affirmative and who would be defeated if no
evidence were offered on either side- is entitled
to open the evidence; he should then introduce all
his evi:dence ~n chief, and after his adversary has
introduced all his evidence in chief, the former
should be confined to rebuttal evidence. Generally
speaking, on rebuttal he can give only such evidence in reply as tends to answer new matter
introduced by his adversary.
"If every party had a right to introduce evidence at any time, at his own election, without
reference to the stage of the trial in which it is
offered, the proceedings of the court would often
be embarrassed, the purposes of justice be obstructed, and the parties themselves be surprised
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by evidence destructive of their rights, which they
could not have foreseen or in any manner have
guarded against. Although the rule regarding the
order of evidence should be followed as far as
practicable, it is not inflexible; the order of the
evidence is necessarily governed by the trial
judge. * * * Nevertheless, it i·s the duty of the
parties to introduce thdr evidence in proper
order, and if they fail to do so it vs discretionary
with the court whether the evidence shall be admitted. * * *

"* * * Whether there shall be a departure
from the usual order of proof is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and an appellate court will interfere only where
there is an abuse of discretion, as where the
effect is to countenance or aid trickery or unfairness on the part of counsel." (Emphasis ours.)
§ 120. "After the parties have introduced
their evidence in chief they are as a general rule
confined to rebuttal evidence that is, evidence
which answers or disputes that given by the opposite party - evidence in denial of some affirmative case or fact which the adverse party has
attempted to prove, - except as the trial court
may in its discretion permit a party to introduce
evidence which could have been given as part
of the testimony in chief. One cannot, except in
the diJscretion of the trial court, introduce as a
part of hi~s rebuttal testtmony relative to new
and independent facts competent as a part of his
testimony in chief. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)
§ 121. "As a general rule the party upon
which the affirmative of an issue devolves vs
bound to give all his evidence in support of the
issue in the first instance, and wiU not be perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mitted to hold back part of his evidence confirmatory of his case and then offer it on rebuttal.
Rebuttal testimony offered by the plaintiff should
rebut the testimony brought out by the defendant
and should consist of nothing which could have
been offered in chief. * * * Nor, as a general
rule will the discretion of the trial court in refusing to permit evidence in chief to be introduced
in rebuttal be interfered with, and in some jurisdictions the appellate courts will not review this
discretion. * * *'' (Emphasis ours.)

Manifestly, there was no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court when his ruling is viewed in light
of the above principles. Plaintiff had every opportunity
to present the proffered evidence on her case in chief.
Obviously that was the proper place for it. It would be
most unfair to a defendant to permit the plaintiff to
hold back part of his evidence in chief in the guise of
rebuttal evidence, simply because it had the incidental
effect of rebutting some item of defendant's proof. Evidence with respect to speed was a part of plaintiff's
case in chief, and should have been offered at that time.
The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
receive the proffered evidence at the end of the trial.
Plaintiff also seeks to justify the belated offer on
the grounds that the proffered evidence would help to
establish a last clear chance situation, since it would
show the distance deceased was from defendant Hecker,
when first observed. However, the undisputed testimony
of Hecker shows that brakes were initially applied because other rars n1oving in the san1e traffic pattern
were slowing down, and decedent was not yet in sight.
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.K ol' would such evidence show where deceased was when
first observed, what he was doing, or how he can1e into
collision with the Hecker car. Counsel for plaintiff expressly stated that the evidence was offered .to prove
speed. No other purpose was suggested. The objection
to it was properly sustained.

POINT VI
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT
HECKER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT A'T
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. EVEN IF THERE WAS
SUCH EVIDENCE, IT WOULD BE IMMA'TERIAL ON APPEAL, SINCE THE JURY FOUND NO LIABILITY ON THE
PART OF HECKER.

We answer here plaintiff's POINT VII.
In view of the fact that the jury found either nonnegligence on the part of the defendant liecker, or contributory negligence on the part of deceased, or both,
even if there was any error of the trial court in determining the issue of scope of employment, such error "\Yonld
be wholly immaterial on this appeal, since plaintiff cannot have been prejudicied thereby. However, there was
no error in that regard.
At the time of the accident defendant I-Iecker "\Yas
operating an automobile owned by his employer and
used by him both for business purposes and for his
personal pleasure. At the time of the accident, IIecker
was on his way from his home to his employer's office,
preparatory to starting his day's work. l-Ie had no
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errands or missions of any type to perform for his employer between his horne and the office. He would have
no duties to perform for his e1nployer until he arrived
at the office. The mere fact that his aut01nobile \vas
furnished by his employer, and that the cost of operation
was borne by his employer, did not mean that he was
in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
On the contrary, under familiar principles of agency
law, well established by innumerable decisions of this
court, he was not in the scope of his employment at the
tirne the accident occurred. The rule is stated in the
Restatement of the L.aw of Agency, Sec. 238, as follows:
"Except as stated in §§ 212-214, a master is
liable for harm caused by the use of instrumentalities entrusted by him to a servant only if they
are used within the scope of employment."
Under C01nment b thereunder, it is said:
"The 1nere fact that the n1aster habitually
allows the servant to use the instrumentality, or
even that the master 1naintains the instrumentality entirely for the use of the servant, does
not of itself subject the master to liability. The
master is liable only when the instrumentality
is being used by the· servant for the purpose of
advancing the employer's business or interests,
as distinguished fr01n the private affairs of the
servant. Thus, a 1naster who purchases an automobile for the convenience of his servants is not
subject to liability when a servant is using it
for his own purposes; nor is he liable if a group
of servants, with his pennission use it for private
purposes. * * * ''
To the san1e effect see 35 An1. J ur., :Master and
Servant, Sec. 580.
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In a long line of industrial cases, Utah has adhered
to this rule. See Greer v. Ind. Comm. of Utah, (Utah),
~79 Pac. 900; F'ideUty & Castwlty Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
(Utah), 8 Pac. (2d) 617; Roberts v. Industrial C01nm.,
(Utah), 47 Pac. (2d) 1052; Vitagraph, Inc. v. Incl. C01n1n.
(Utah), 85 Pac. (2d) 601; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. 1nd. ComnL., CC tah), 110 Pac. (2d) 334; London (Inarantee & Accident Co. v. Frazee, (Utah), 185 Pac. (2d)
284, and Wilson v. Industrial Com1n., (Utah), 207 Pac.
(2d) 1116.
Although the forego1ng cases were decided under the
Workman's Compensation Act, there appears no reason
why the same rule would not apply where an injured
party seeks to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior.
As said by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case
of Elli:s & Lewi's, Inc. v. Trimble, 67 Pac. (2d) 244,
decided under anologous circumstances :
"'The cases above cited are workmen's compensation cases. But there can be no difference
in legal principle on this account: It would be
absurd to say, in applying liberally the workmen's compensation laws, that one engaged in
rendering such services was an independent contractor and was not entitled to the benefits of the
law for his own injuries; and, on the other hand
to say, in similar circumstances, that he was a
servant or agent of the one for whom he was
rendering services, and could serve as a conduit
to carry responsibility for his acts to the one for
whom he was rendering services, and thereby
enable a third person to be benefited for his
injuries."
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The issue was submitted to the jury, which was more
than plaintiff was entitled to receive. I~ven if there
were error, it would be immaterial and non-prejudicial
in view of the jury's findings on the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence.
POINT VII
'THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WERE ADEQUATE.

THE

We here answer plaintiff's POIKT VIII.·
Plaintiff complains that the court failed to give her
requested instructions numbered 16 and 17, to the effect
that a witness may be impeached by _evidence of inconsistent statements made on other occasions. While the
court did not deal specifically with the effect of prior
inconsistent statements, the court gave the jury a general
and con1plete instruction regarding the credibility of
witnesses in its Instruction No. 26. Mter advising the
jury of various 1natters which n1ight be considered by the
jurors in determining the credibility of the witnesses,
the court advised the1n that they might also consider
any fact or circun1stance in evidence "which in the judgnlent of the jury affects the credibility of any witness.''
The jury was further advised that if they believed thai
any witness had ·wilfully testified falsely on any material
1natter, then the whole of his testimony might be disregarded unless such testin1ony was corroborated by
other credible evidence.
Although the court did not specifically refer to prior
inconsistent statmnents, it would be a naive jury indeed,
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which would fail to understand that prior inconsistent
statements of a 1naterial nature, not satisfactorily explained, would affect the credibility of the witness. Although the requests presented by the plaintiff might
properly have been given, the refusal of the court to give
them does not constitute error, where the jury was advised by another instruction concerning the credibility
of witnesses.

In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, page 557, it is said:
"The jury are properly directed as to the
tests of credibility by an instruction that the
credibility of the witnesses is a question exclusively for the jury, and that they have a right to
determine from the appearance of the witnesses
on the stand, their manner of testifying, their
apparent intelligence or lack thereof, their youth,
and from all the surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial, which witnesses are to be
dee1ned worthy of credit."
And at page 579 of the san1e text, it is further said:
"And the refusal of a request is not error
where the matter is covered by the court's general
charge, or where not applicable."
The Utah rule appears to be in accord \vith this
view. In the case of Black v. Rocky 1l1o1Antain Bell Tel.
Co., (Utah), 73 Pac. 514, this court sajd:
"The following instruction was also. given:
'You are further instructed that you are the sole
judges of the facts in this case and the credibility
of the witnesses. You have a right to determine
from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand,
their manner of testifying, their apparent candor
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and frankness, or lack of it, their apparent intelligence, and from all the other surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial, which witnesses
are the more worthy of credit, and give credit
accordingly. You are not bound to take the testimony of any witness as absolutely true, and you
should not do so if you are satisfied from all the
facts and circumstances proved on the trial that
such witness is mistaken in the matter testified
by him, or that for any other reason his testimony
is untrue or unreliable.' The appellant contends
that the terms 'or that for any other reason his
testimony is untrue or unreliable,' as used in this
instruction, were error. While we do not think
that those terms were as clear of ambiguity as is
desirable in instructions, yet when read in connection with the preceding language, and in view
of the evidence, we do not think they were such
as could affect the result, and were not, therefore, reversible error."
No litigant is entitled to dmnand that any instruction
of the court be given in the language fran1ed by the
litigant or his counsel. All that any litigant can demand
is that the jury be instructed in substance as to the
1natters before them for consideration. The language
of the court's instruction in this case, sufficiently advised
the jury concerning these 1natters, and plaintiff has been
unable to de1nonstrate any prejudice. There \Yas no prejudicial error in the court's refusal to charge in the
language of plaintiff's request.
POINT VIII
THE APPEAL AS AGAINST HARTFORD A·CCIDENT &
INDEMNITY COMPANY, NOT HAVING BEEN ARGUED OR
BRIEFED, IS WAIVED.
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Plaintiff's notice of appeal indicated that plaintiff
appealed frmn the sunnuary judginent entered in favor
of the defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Cmnpany, and against plaintiff on the second cause of action.
However, that point has neither been cited nor argued in
plaintiff's brief. Under familiar principles of appellate
practice, it is therefore deemed waived. 3 A1n. J ur., Appeal and Error, page 366; Falkner v. Smith, 77 ·utah 410,
296 Pac. 776; Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 Pac.
1093; Smith vs. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P. (2d)
259.
CONCLUSION
vVe believe that our ,argu1nent can be no better sulnmarized than bY quoting from the recent opinion of this
court in the case of Joseph v. W. 1-l. Groves Latter-day
Saints 11 ospital, 348 P. 2d 935, where this court said:
"What the parties are entitled to and the law
seeks to afford is an opportunity for one claiming
a grievance which would justify legal redress to
present it to a court or jury and to have a fair
trial. When this is done, and the verdict and judgment are entered, all presumptions are in favor
of their validity. 'The burden is upon the appellant not only to show that there was error, but that
it was prejudicial to the extent that there is
reasonable likelihood hat in its absence there
would have been a different result. We find no
such error here."
vVe believe that a perusal of the record will convince the court, that there was no evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendants; that the plaintiff's own
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evidence established contributory negligence on the part
of the deceased; that there was no error in law occurring
at the trial prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff; that
plaintiff had a fair trial, and should abide the result.
The judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Respondents

BY RAY R.

CHRISTENSEN

1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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